Jonathan Loesberg
Jonathan Loesberg
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
The British naval investments were more or less a continuation of a naval superiority policy that predated the Napoleonic wars, IMHO. The German buildup was an abrupt change; enabled partly (& ironically) by the development of the Dreadnought class battleships, which evened the playing field somewhat. Germany being more land-locked and with fewer colonies & smaller trade would be arguments against needing a big navy, no? FWIW, I'm strongly influenced in this conversation by Robert Massie's book Dreadnought.originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
As a generality, I agree. I would point to the size of the German naval buildup as an exception - something that was a dramatic change in policy, and could have been avoided in the name of frugality, diplomacy, and strategic focus. Not the same as the generic European military buildup of the time IMHO. More like Iran's missile program. Of course it's not the sole factor in starting the war, just one more.originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Wilhelm was also a total flake.
Both true, both not to the point.
Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.
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I'm not following your reasoning here. There was no chance that England, given its history, merchant marine and colonial empire, would allow any power in the early 1900s to equal or exceed its navy. However, the German decision to invest massively in its navy was unnecessary from the POV of protecting either their coastal waters, small colonial ventures or global trade. The English perceived it as a deliberate decision to threaten their position. Therefore, a policy decision by Germany increased the likelihood of their participation in WWI against the central powers.
I wasn't saying there was any likelihood England would do this. I was saying that the arms race growing out of Imperial competition was a common project, so to speak. You can't fault Germany for engaging in it and not England...
So, I will readily admit that I know British history better than I do German history. My reading in late 19th century and early 20th century history discusses the British naval build-up as pretty impressive, especially technologically. Germany was more threatened by it as it was mostly landlocked. So Britain could have easily closed off their access to the colonies. I ask this as a genuine question though: with this context in mind, was their naval build-up really more provocative than Britain's, unless you take their Imperial ambitions as more at fault?
No, if you need access to the colonies and to expland your trade, you need a navy to protect what access you have and to protect your merchant marine.
I haven't read Massie since it first came out over 30 years ago, so my memory of it, to say the least, is not perfect. As I do remember it, what was striking was how it teased the history of the arms battle out of biographies of the people involved. It did not seem to me to diverge from the long held view that the history was one of mistakes and miscalculations on both sides. Am I wrong?