Alcohol and health

originally posted by Pavel Tchichikov:
originally posted by fatboy:
at least in my corner of teh species, teh booze seems to play in important facilitatory role in reproduction.

you gotta lay off teh pink gold, man

you think i can palm teh paternity suits off on leon? tell me more!

fb.
 
originally posted by fatboy:
originally posted by Pavel Tchichikov:
originally posted by fatboy:
at least in my corner of teh species, teh booze seems to play in important facilitatory role in reproduction.

you gotta lay off teh pink gold, man

you think i can palm teh paternity suits off on leon? tell me more!

fb.

i have got to see THAT insurance policy
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.
 
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point. It would not have mattered if France had not been looking for reasons to go to war with Germany, if Russia had not used the Serbian resistance to the Austro-Hungarian Empire as an excuse to go to war with that empire to protect and expand its own frontiers, and if, finally, the UK had not decided that it had to honor its own non aggression treaty with France. Germany's original motive entailed supporting the Austro-Hungarian Empire in its attempt to eliminate Serbian resistance its treatment of its own Serbian population. The intricate network of non aggression treaties, twenty years of an arms race, and various kinds of desires for expansion were a barrel of dynamite waiting for a spark. The situation was essentially different from the causes of WWII. There is a reason that part of the debate about Viet Nam and the Cold War was whether the relevant historical analogy was Munich or the Guns of August, both referred to explicitly in those terms.
 
Couple of points:

-Tuchman's Guns of August is mostly seen as out of date (at best) these days. Clark's book holds sway in English, but I think moves the question too far to a neutral point of view. (Meaning: all great powers share a roughly similar amount of blame.)

-It is now held to be true by most scholars that evidence of French revanchism is lacking. (The prime example being the lack of interest in Alsace-Lorraine, pre August 1914)

-UK's causus belli was the German violation of Belgian neutrality. Actual treaty stipulations forcing cooperation with France were few and vague. Debates in the cabinet tended against the declaration of war before Belgian neutrality was violated.

-The Russian break with A-H has its roots in the Crimean war. The "Three Emperors" / Holy League had been an effective reactionary force since the defeat of Napoleon. A-H greatly profited by, inter alia, Russia's help in crushing the '48 rebellion. A-H foolishly took a neutral point of view in the Crimean war and then used the opportunity for minimal gains in the Balkans. Despite Bismarck's expert management of the situation, the relationship was never fully patched up. A conference similar to 1878 (etc) could have managed Sarajevo, instead the pilot had been dropped and Berlin was rudderless.
 
originally posted by Tristan Welles:
Couple of points:

-Tuchman's Guns of August is mostly seen as out of date (at best) these days. Clark's book holds sway in English, but I think moves the question too far to a neutral point of view. (Meaning: all great powers share a roughly similar amount of blame.)

-It is now held to be true by most scholars that evidence of French revanchism is lacking. (The prime example being the lack of interest in Alsace-Lorraine, pre August 1914)

-UK's causus belli was the German violation of Belgian neutrality. Actual treaty stipulations forcing cooperation with France were few and vague. Debates in the cabinet tended against the declaration of war before Belgian neutrality was violated.

-The Russian break with A-H has its roots in the Crimean war. The "Three Emperors" / Holy League had been an effective reactionary force since the defeat of Napoleon. A-H greatly profited by, inter alia, Russia's help in crushing the '48 rebellion. A-H foolishly took a neutral point of view in the Crimean war and then used the opportunity for minimal gains in the Balkans. Despite Bismarck's expert management of the situation, the relationship was never fully patched up. A conference similar to 1878 (etc) could have managed Sarajevo, instead the pilot had been dropped and Berlin was rudderless.

Interesting use of passive voice and vague reference. "It now held." "Clark's sway holds in English." In the US, Tuchman's book is recognized as superseded, but is not thought of as having no role in understanding events at the outbreak of the war. What other views of Clark are there and what evidence do they adduce for the insufficiency of his view? Who holds that evidence of French Revanchism is "lacking?" It has been routinely cited in earlier histories?" In any case, the French military preparations were evident. As for alliances between France and England being few and vague, while the Entente Cordiale is not a mutual defense treaty, it was a basis for the UK to enter WWI. What interests they had in doing so were far outweighed, as most know, by any interests served in doing so. Finally, are you really saying that the war was a result of German aggressive designs on Western Europe similar to those of WWII. If not, all this amounts to quibbling about French motivation.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.
 
originally posted by Tristan Welles:
Couple of points:

-It is now held to be true by most scholars that evidence of French revanchism is lacking. (The prime example being the lack of interest in Alsace-Lorraine, pre August 1914)
.
That's interesting. What is the evidence? Newspaper coverage, legislative behavior, government records, something else?
 
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.

Imperialistic ambitions and arms races have long been held to be among the causes of WWI. You might as well argue that removing the English build up would have discouraged them from entering the war. Again, since Imperialism was already common to England and France and the Germans had started looking for colonies of their own in the 19th century, causes such as these are why one cannot blame the war on one side's aggression or another's.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.

...You might as well argue that removing the English build up would have discouraged them from entering the war...

I'm not following your reasoning here. There was no chance that England, given its history, merchant marine and colonial empire, would allow any power in the early 1900s to equal or exceed its navy. However, the German decision to invest massively in its navy was unnecessary from the POV of protecting either their coastal waters, small colonial ventures or global trade. The English perceived it as a deliberate decision to threaten their position. Therefore, a policy decision by Germany increased the likelihood of their participation in WWI against the central powers.
 
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.

..

I'm not following your reasoning here. There was no chance that England, given its history, merchant marine and colonial empire, would allow any power in the early 1900s to equal or exceed its navy. However, the German decision to invest massively in its navy was unnecessary from the POV of protecting either their coastal waters, small colonial ventures or global trade. The English perceived it as a deliberate decision to threaten their position. Therefore, a policy decision by Germany increased the likelihood of their participation in WWI against the central powers.

I wasn't saying there was any likelihood England would do this. I was saying that the arms race growing out of Imperial competition was a common project, so to speak. You can't fault Germany for engaging in it and not England. As I said, imperialist competition (France plays a role here too) and the arms race are two of the six causes generally given for having caused WWI. If there is a seriously considered revisionist theory that means to consider Germany as the sole aggressor as in WWII, I am unaware of it. I am happy to be pointed in the right direction, but I would need some persuading to see Bismark or Wilhelm as having the kind of European designs Hitler had.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.

..

I'm not following your reasoning here. There was no chance that England, given its history, merchant marine and colonial empire, would allow any power in the early 1900s to equal or exceed its navy. However, the German decision to invest massively in its navy was unnecessary from the POV of protecting either their coastal waters, small colonial ventures or global trade. The English perceived it as a deliberate decision to threaten their position. Therefore, a policy decision by Germany increased the likelihood of their participation in WWI against the central powers.

I wasn't saying there was any likelihood England would do this. I was saying that the arms race growing out of Imperial competition was a common project, so to speak. You can't fault Germany for engaging in it and not England...
As a generality, I agree. I would point to the size of the German naval buildup as an exception - something that was a dramatic change in policy, and could have been avoided in the name of frugality, diplomacy, and strategic focus. Not the same as the generic European military buildup of the time IMHO. More like Iran's missile program. Of course it's not the sole factor in starting the war, just one more.
 
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.

..

I'm not following your reasoning here. There was no chance that England, given its history, merchant marine and colonial empire, would allow any power in the early 1900s to equal or exceed its navy. However, the German decision to invest massively in its navy was unnecessary from the POV of protecting either their coastal waters, small colonial ventures or global trade. The English perceived it as a deliberate decision to threaten their position. Therefore, a policy decision by Germany increased the likelihood of their participation in WWI against the central powers.

I wasn't saying there was any likelihood England would do this. I was saying that the arms race growing out of Imperial competition was a common project, so to speak. You can't fault Germany for engaging in it and not England...
As a generality, I agree. I would point to the size of the German naval buildup as an exception - something that was a dramatic change in policy, and could have been avoided in the name of frugality, diplomacy, and strategic focus. Not the same as the generic European military buildup of the time IMHO. More like Iran's missile program. Of course it's not the sole factor in starting the war, just one more.

So, I will readily admit that I know British history better than I do German history. My reading in late 19th century and early 20th century history discusses the British naval build-up as pretty impressive, especially technologically. Germany was more threatened by it as it was mostly landlocked. So Britain could have easily closed off their access to the colonies. I ask this as a genuine question though: with this context in mind, was their naval build-up really more provocative than Britain's, unless you take their Imperial ambitions as more at fault?
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
My reading in late 19th century and early 20th century history discusses the British naval build-up as pretty impressive, especially technologically. Germany was more threatened by it as it was mostly landlocked. So Britain could have easily closed off their access to the colonies. I ask this as a genuine question though: with this context in mind, was their naval build-up really more provocative than Britain's, unless you take their Imperial ambitions as more at fault?
More provocative per se, no. But the British were twitchy in that period: They finally won the Boer War but it had dragged on way too long (for a supposedly top-rank power versus farmers) and involved concentration camps and war crimes trials afterward. The British Admiralty insisted on a 2:1 advantage in war vessels over anyone else (which they achieved in smaller ship designs) but dreadnoughts were slow to build, very expensive, and although the British were first -- HMS Dreadnought, actually -- every other major nation had already started building their own.

These two items together actually threw down the Conservatives in 1906 because the War showed that the average Brit was not in good health yet lucre was being spent by the boatload on showy super-weapons that nobody needed.

All of which is to say that Brits were more open than usual to making nice with the French, traditional enemies, as a hedge against the Triple Alliance (...meaning Germany as the other two were not up to snuff).
 
Sure, but this is only strengthening my case that the Germans had some justification for seeing their naval build-up as essentially defensive (it was the Brits who mandated the two to one advantage of their navy over everyone else), again given their limited access to the ocean.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Christian Miller (CMM):
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...I think her analysis was essentially, also, that the war was caused by a course of diplomatic and armament choices made by all of the Western European countries since the turn of the century and not the result German initiative.
Germany was late to the Colonialism game and they were eager to acquire subordinate nations and take their wealth. Or so I've read.

Wilhelm was also a total flake.

Both true, both not to the point.
I think it is relevant. Germany's late scramble into colonialism led to the need for a merchant marine, and then a need for a larger navy to protect said merchant marine without relying on other countries (wasn't actually necessary, except for national & kaiser pride). The development of the Dreadnought class of battleships created a chance to "even the playing field" in terms of naval technology. Tirpitz leveraged both to convince the German government to go on a massive naval spending spree. Which in turn convinced the British the Germans were up to no good and helped propel them into the arms of the French.

Remove the German naval buildup and perhaps the Anglo-French alliance is less tight or England plays a broker role in French-German tensions. Speculative, yes, but not illogical.

..

I'm not following your reasoning here. There was no chance that England, given its history, merchant marine and colonial empire, would allow any power in the early 1900s to equal or exceed its navy. However, the German decision to invest massively in its navy was unnecessary from the POV of protecting either their coastal waters, small colonial ventures or global trade. The English perceived it as a deliberate decision to threaten their position. Therefore, a policy decision by Germany increased the likelihood of their participation in WWI against the central powers.

I wasn't saying there was any likelihood England would do this. I was saying that the arms race growing out of Imperial competition was a common project, so to speak. You can't fault Germany for engaging in it and not England...
As a generality, I agree. I would point to the size of the German naval buildup as an exception - something that was a dramatic change in policy, and could have been avoided in the name of frugality, diplomacy, and strategic focus. Not the same as the generic European military buildup of the time IMHO. More like Iran's missile program. Of course it's not the sole factor in starting the war, just one more.

So, I will readily admit that I know British history better than I do German history. My reading in late 19th century and early 20th century history discusses the British naval build-up as pretty impressive, especially technologically. Germany was more threatened by it as it was mostly landlocked. So Britain could have easily closed off their access to the colonies. I ask this as a genuine question though: with this context in mind, was their naval build-up really more provocative than Britain's, unless you take their Imperial ambitions as more at fault?
The British naval investments were more or less a continuation of a naval superiority policy that predated the Napoleonic wars, IMHO. The German buildup was an abrupt change; enabled partly (& ironically) by the development of the Dreadnought class battleships, which evened the playing field somewhat. Germany being more land-locked and with fewer colonies & smaller trade would be arguments against needing a big navy, no? FWIW, I'm strongly influenced in this conversation by Robert Massie's book Dreadnought.
 
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