Chauvet/Lacan

Do I understand arights?: The elemental wine, of which Chauvet speaks, is similar to that elusive "real world" that we believe exists outside of us but, because our relationship to it is mediated by our senses, we are obliged to describe it only using the values that our senses deliver to us (e.g., this is longer than that, this is cold, this is green). The thrust is that we cannot say what anything is, only how it appears. This is idealism in a form originally established by George Berkeley ("esse est percipi").

One could spin off further into ontology and into epistemology at this point -- Nelson Goodman, anyone? -- but I'd rather backtrack to your comment about wine that we call barolo.

Only with time in wood does the wine become barolo. Until that time, the wine is a nebbiolo varietal (with potential). But is this just fiddling around with the title of the substance? Or, if language mediates all, is that all there is for us to do?

A foal is not a race-horse. But if his sire is, and if I raise him right, then he will be a race-horse. There is some race-horse-ness about him, even as a newborn.
 
originally posted by Jeff Grossman:
Do I understand arights?: The elemental wine, of which Chauvet speaks, is similar to that elusive "real world" that we believe exists outside of us but, because our relationship to it is mediated by our senses, we are obliged to describe it only using the values that our senses deliver to us (e.g., this is longer than that, this is cold, this is green). The thrust is that we cannot say what anything is, only how it appears. This is idealism in a form originally established by George Berkeley ("esse est percipi").
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I don't believe the Bishop is the correct analogy, because there is nothing here about the wine not existing unless it is perceived. That would be Berkeley.

To say "it is mediated by our senses" takes into account another side of the equation that is not dealt with in what I wrote. It confuses the issue, I think. Actually, it gets in exactly the wrong way around. The variable is not whether we call it green or red. The variable is the actual signified.

The reference is to linguistic theory. What changes, and this is all me thinking about Lacan, not from Chauvet, is how we understand the same essence based on how it is expressed.

Let me be clear here. Chauvet was talking about wine and what comes from the wine and what is foreign to the wine. I am pointing out that this concept my not necessarily have been much talked about before. That previously what we might say comes from the wine was thought of as a part of a recipe, not something isolated and on its own. I am also saying that for me, and this is from me, I believe that this concept developed at much the same time and if you look at it, in a similar way, as the idea of the unconscious mind. So there is an unconscious mind, it has a relationship with the conscious mind. The unconscious mind drives our conscious mind, but is also filtered through the conscious mind, which alters the outcome of what is said and done. This is what I am saying.

The variable happens when you add the what is foreign to wine to wine. There is the change. I broke it down in the context of a language in my original post. I said that if wine itself had a sentence of meaning that that sentence could change based upon, basically, how it was spoken. Houston, TX and Houston Street are not said the same way. The sentence says Houston. That is all it says. As an example and an oversimplification, you could say that oak makes the meaning Houston, TX and steel makes the meaning Houston Street. Either way the sentence is the same. But the meaning of the sentence is different. This is the action of what is foreign to wine on wine. The effect of the conscious mind on the unconscious. This was influenced by Lacan, who said that the unconscious is structured like a language. That you could change the signified through the action of the signifier. This would be like Berkeley saying, well, if you call it green, as opposed to red, then you change the actual substance, which I don't believe he said, because he didn't believe in an actual substance. Lacan was an Aristotelian. Chauvet was a scientist. They were dealing with this world, not a Platonic one.

I think where one might raise objections here is where I said that the essence might not be understood by us, but still inspire awe from us. As do hieroglyphs. I was talking about the change in meaning of the original sentence by how it is expressed. That the change may be so stark that we might not grasp the original, or even find the expressed intelligible.

The Barolo reference was to talk about how what in a modern age might be seen as something by itself was in an earlier time a part of a recipe of how it was to be brought up or not brought up. That's all it was.

I think some confusion lies with the fact that with what I originally wrote, a new and separate idea is outlined in each paragraph. I perhaps went too fast.
 
Levi,
I don't pretend to understand all that you've written as I probably lack the proper background. Nonetheless, Chauvet's writing, and your Lacanian take on it, makes me think of an article I just read in the London Review of Books on "outsider art." One thesis of the article was this: one of the salient features of outsider art is the unselfconsciousness of the artistic act, but that that unselfconsciousness breaks down the moment that outsider art is recognized as such. It was a very interesting article and I cannot do it justice, alas, but I was reminded of it variously when reading your thoughts.

Mark Lipton
 
Actually, as I read your citations from Chauvet, Berkeley is much better than linguistics since signifieds don't exist apart from signifiers and I take it, at least as a matter of concept, the wine of wine does. Berkeley does not think that reality exists only as mediated by perception, although empiricists who followed him did. He thought reality existed in the mind of God. I have to say that I think that the wine of wine is probably like other concepts dreamt up about the empirical world by the pure reason, best used as a regulative idea than the designation of some actual essence.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
Actually, as I read your citations from Chauvet, Berkeley is much better than linguistics since signifieds don't exist apart from signifiers and I take it, at least as a matter of concept, the wine of wine does. Berkeley does not think that reality exists only as mediated by perception, although empiricists who followed him did. He thought reality existed in the mind of God. I have to say that I think that the wine of wine is probably like other concepts dreamt up about the empirical world by the pure reason, best used as a regulative idea than the designation of some actual essence.
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It is possible that you would be less dismissive if you actually understood what I wrote. But it is nice to be misunderstood by you.

You are not alone in understanding that Berkeley thought of reality as existing in the perception of God. I also understand that he thought that, and I alluded to it. I also explained that I didn't think this was an apt analogy, and actually for that reason. Because nobody is talking about wine exisitng in another realm here in what I have written.

When you say that linguistics is a bad lens for the understanding you are conflating two layers of signified and signifier and creating an artificial problem that isn't there.

The signifier of the signified wine is the sentence of meaning that that wine possesses. First layer.

You add something apart from the wine, a different signifier, which changes the sentence of meaning by inflecting a new meaning. Second layer.
 
1) Berkeley doesn't think reality exists in the perception of God but in the mind of God.

2) As defined by Saussure, the signified is not the thing in the world, it is the concept in the mind of the thing in the world. In other words, the signified of the word "tree" isn't some tree thing out there, it is the picture of treeness that makes the word function as a word.

If that is what you mean by "the meaning of wine," then you are right, I guess. But it not what I think Chauvet means by the wine of wine, which is something more like its essence than its meaning. But part of my problem here is that I don't think it's coherent to talk about the meaning of things unless one thinks they were made to communicate meaning. If one thinks of wine like that, then the things Chauvet subtracts, the winemaking, would have to be precisely what one looked for as signifiers to understand the concept the winemaker signified.

You are certainly write that I don't entirely understand what you wrote. I still don't understand the corrective of the last sentence.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...
2) As defined by Saussure, the signified is not the thing in the world, it is the concept in the mind of the thing in the world. In other words, the signified of the word "tree" isn't some tree thing out there, it is the picture of treeness that makes the word function as a word.
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In post-Kantian terms, I take it the signified is noumenal rather than phenomenal? Did Saussure have an anthropomorphic perspective on things in the world, suggesting they have ideas?
 
originally posted by Cliff:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
...
2) As defined by Saussure, the signified is not the thing in the world, it is the concept in the mind of the thing in the world. In other words, the signified of the word "tree" isn't some tree thing out there, it is the picture of treeness that makes the word function as a word.
Click to expand...

In post-Kantian terms, I take it the signified is noumenal rather than phenomenal? Did Saussure have an anthropomorphic perspective on things in the world, suggesting they have ideas?
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This is part of the argument I'm having with Levi, I think. Things have noumena. Signifieds aren't things and they aren't noumena. They are our concepts that we attach to signifieds. Conversely, though Saussure had no position on whether there were noumena, because things in the world aren't signifiers, they don't have signifieds. Things humans produce to signify have signifieds, of course, and they are things in the world. But from that problem comes Derrida and so we won't go there.
 
originally posted by Levi Dalton:
The signifier of the signified wine is the sentence of meaning that that wine possesses. First layer.

You add something apart from the wine, a different signifier, which changes the sentence of meaning by inflecting a new meaning. Second layer.
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OK, that helped.

I still think that phenomenology can inform the First Layer: although I look at a thing and say it is green, and you look at a thing and say it is green, there is no way to know what your experience of green is the same as mine. Which is to say that the thing offers some value of res extensa and we speakers, severally and jointly, attempt to pronounce that value. We will, of course, do that differently among ourselves.

Second Layer is also interesting. I ask a question this way: In what does barolo-ness lie? It is not the young wine because without proper aging it is not barolo. It is not the wood, or even the span of years, because neither will become barolo without wine (and maybe other things). So, barolo-ness is an assemblage of other things/ideas. Which leaves us in the position, possibly, of saying that there is no such a thing as barolo unless there is an observer who knows that the assemblage is complete.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
1) Berkeley doesn't think reality exists in the perception of God but in the mind of God.
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You're write in this instance, I miswrote.

But part of my problem here is that I don't think it's coherent to talk about the meaning of things unless one thinks they were made to communicate meaning.
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How do we even begin to know if something was "made" to communicate meaning, and know if it serves such a purpose in fact, and who made it? How do I know that every hieroglyph has a meaning? What if one does not, but is just an abstract picture? What meaning would that convey, to whom, could that meaning be lost through time if in fact it existed, and what if it was never, ever properly understood, even by the writer?

To say that something is made to communicate meaning to me implies a universe full of sacred texts. What are you saying about wine if you are saying it is a sacred text?

If one thinks of wine like that, then the things Chauvet subtracts, the winemaking, would have to be precisely what one looked for as signifiers to understand the concept the winemaker signified.
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When you read today, as one often does, that the aim of a given winemaker is to add as little as possible and to subtract as little as possible (from the wine), what is it that you think they are saying? Why do you think they are saying this? Do you think that a Greek might have said this before he mixed the concentrated (cooked down) wine with water?
 
originally posted by Levi Dalton:
But part of my problem here is that I don't think it's coherent to talk about the meaning of things unless one thinks they were made to communicate meaning.
Click to expand...

How do we even begin to know if something was "made" to communicate meaning, and know if it serves such a purpose in fact, and who made it? How do I know that every hieroglyph has a meaning? What if one does not, but is just an abstract picture? What meaning would that convey, to whom, could that meaning be lost through time if in fact it existed, and what if it was never, ever properly understood, even by the writer?

To say that something is made to communicate meaning to me implies a universe full of sacred texts. What are you saying about wine if you are saying it is a sacred text?
Click to expand...

This obscures the problem with facile metaphysics. Ultimately, it may be the case that we can't distinguish between kinds of objects. But most of the time, we do OK at it. I can tell the difference between novels and flowers. Those who can't are doomed to believe in the argument from design (see Hume). Even dogs can tell the difference between being kicked and being tripped over, although they no doubt make mistakes from time to time.

To say that some things are made to communicate meaning and that those are the things that do communcate meaning, is to imply precisely that there are no sacred texts in the universe, only human texts.

It comes down to this, if you think that rocks and stones and senseless things have meanings, then we need to invent a new word for what poems, paintings and ordinary utterances do.
If one thinks of wine like that, then the things Chauvet subtracts, the winemaking, would have to be precisely what one looked for as signifiers to understand the concept the winemaker signified.
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When you read today, as one often does, that the aim of a given winemaker is to add as little as possible and to subtract as little as possible (from the wine), what is it that you think they are saying? Why do you think they are saying this? Do you think that a Greek might have said this before he mixed the concentrated (cooked down) wine with water?
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I know what they are saying and I know that translated into facile metaphysics, the claim is incoherent. I think as a matter of practice, what those winemakers do is describable and has a real end. Describing it as seeking the wine of the wine will lead to silly internet threads because the empirical challenge to the claim, like your metaphysical skepticism above, is easy but not helpful.

As I said, I think the Chauvet you quote provides a concept that has a role to play, but only when one understands the antinomies it leads to--to use the Kantian language Cliff suspects me of--and takes it as an interesting concept. As a goal, it commits the idealism of pure reason, which also gets us back to the argument from design, but that's another story.
 
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Levi Dalton:
But part of my problem here is that I don't think it's coherent to talk about the meaning of things unless one thinks they were made to communicate meaning.
Click to expand...

How do we even begin to know if something was "made" to communicate meaning, and know if it serves such a purpose in fact, and who made it? How do I know that every hieroglyph has a meaning? What if one does not, but is just an abstract picture? What meaning would that convey, to whom, could that meaning be lost through time if in fact it existed, and what if it was never, ever properly understood, even by the writer?

To say that something is made to communicate meaning to me implies a universe full of sacred texts. What are you saying about wine if you are saying it is a sacred text?
Click to expand...

This obscures the problem with facile metaphysics. Ultimately, it may be the case that we can't distinguish between kinds of objects. But most of the time, we do OK at it. I can tell the difference between novels and flowers. Those who can't are doomed to believe in the argument from design (see Hume). Even dogs can tell the difference between being kicked and being tripped over, although they no doubt make mistakes from time to time.

To say that some things are made to communicate meaning and that those are the things that do communcate meaning, is to imply precisely that there are no sacred texts in the universe, only human texts.

It comes down to this, if you think that rocks and stones and senseless things have meanings, then we need to invent a new word for what poems, paintings and ordinary utterances do.
If one thinks of wine like that, then the things Chauvet subtracts, the winemaking, would have to be precisely what one looked for as signifiers to understand the concept the winemaker signified.
Click to expand...
When you read today, as one often does, that the aim of a given winemaker is to add as little as possible and to subtract as little as possible (from the wine), what is it that you think they are saying? Why do you think they are saying this? Do you think that a Greek might have said this before he mixed the concentrated (cooked down) wine with water?
Click to expand...

I know what they are saying and I know that translated into facile metaphysics, the claim is incoherent. I think as a matter of practice, what those winemakers do is describable and has a real end. Describing it as seeking the wine of the wine will lead to silly internet threads because the empirical challenge to the claim, like your metaphysical skepticism above, is easy but not helpful.

As I said, I think the Chauvet you quote provides a concept that has a role to play, but only when one understands the antinomies it leads to--to use the Kantian language Cliff suspects me of--and takes it as an interesting concept. As a goal, it commits the idealism of pure reason, which also gets us back to the argument from design, but that's another story.
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Perhaps one day you'll take up what I wrote about instead of what rather interests you.
 
A quick look at Amazon doesn't show any English translation of Chauvet. I can order Aesthetique du Vin from Amazon France, of course, but is there an English translation?
 
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