Jonathan Loesberg
Jonathan Loesberg
I don't know. I don't have an intelligent telephone and thus don't follow the applications that depend upon them.
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Jeebus in Wash DC, 8/24
- Thread starter Larry Stein
- Start date
I don't know. I don't have an intelligent telephone and thus don't follow the applications that depend upon them.
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
originally posted by Cliff:
originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:
By the law of non-contradiction, truth is unitary: a proposition is either accurate or not, true or not. If a question has more than one possible true answer, then one can never know what the true answer is. There might as well be an infinite number of true answers. Usually, there is some wiggle room for two possible answers, though. More than two is simply unacceptable, though. Hence the mode of counting is one, more than one, infinity.
For all philosophers?
Every last one of them. Relativists see counting as an objectivist obsession. objectivists see truth as unitary and so on and so forth. I know this because I've read every single book of philosophy ever written, so you don't need to check for yourself.
You do make things easy! Though this does not square with my recollections of Peirce and Wittgenstein II, among others.
Jonathan Loesberg
Jonathan Loesberg
Peirce was a linguist. Linguists have their own anomalous disciplinary customs, but declining and conjugating do necessitate counting. And Wittgenstein was a one-armed pianist.
I'm surprised you didn't bring up Kant and the 12 Pure Concepts of the Understanding grouped into four categories. I would have had more trouble getting out of that counter-example.
I'm surprised you didn't bring up Kant and the 12 Pure Concepts of the Understanding grouped into four categories. I would have had more trouble getting out of that counter-example.
Jonathan Loesberg
Jonathan Loesberg
The younger brother was a cube and a slab.
I don't think Kant ever committed to the ontological status of the concepts. He claimed them to be logically necessary for all logical beings who perceived material reality as human beings do. But his definition of them did not disallow some other possible rational intelligent species from putting things together differently in a satisfactory way. They were obligatory for us but not necessarily inherently obligatory.
I don't think Kant ever committed to the ontological status of the concepts. He claimed them to be logically necessary for all logical beings who perceived material reality as human beings do. But his definition of them did not disallow some other possible rational intelligent species from putting things together differently in a satisfactory way. They were obligatory for us but not necessarily inherently obligatory.
Given what Kant does tell us about the noumenal and the phenomenal world, can he really have an indeterminate conceptual realm between them? What does this have to do with the sort of anti-foundationalism one finds in LW2, the pragmatists, and, in terms of wine, those who ask of a given wine, best for what, with whom, in what context?
Jonathan Loesberg
Jonathan Loesberg
I'm not sure what Kant has to due with LW2 since LW2 gave up on all of the foundationalism Kant was trying to save.
The conceptual world in Kant, wasn't between the noumena and the phenomena. There was no conceptual "world." The concepts were logical necessities for seeing the phenomenal world as we see it. As I understand Kant, all he claimed to be able to tell us about the noumenal world wss that it was in fact there. More specific claims got you into all the troubles of the Pure Reason that the second half of the first critique criticizes, its antinomies, its paralogisms and its ideals. And it turned out that even claiming we knew the noumenal world was there caused problems enough since we knew it based on knowing that the phenomena had to have a cause, whereas cause and effect was one of the concepts of the understanding and thus incapable of arriving at conclusions about the noumena. When Herder pointed this out and Kant didn't satisfactorily answer, the way was opened for all the excesses of German Romanticism and idealist essentialsms. But really Kant isn't one of those people. He may have made one claim too many, but it is central to his philosophy that we can't know about the noumena and that there is no bridge world (except for our apprehension of beauty, but that is a whole other matter).
The conceptual world in Kant, wasn't between the noumena and the phenomena. There was no conceptual "world." The concepts were logical necessities for seeing the phenomenal world as we see it. As I understand Kant, all he claimed to be able to tell us about the noumenal world wss that it was in fact there. More specific claims got you into all the troubles of the Pure Reason that the second half of the first critique criticizes, its antinomies, its paralogisms and its ideals. And it turned out that even claiming we knew the noumenal world was there caused problems enough since we knew it based on knowing that the phenomena had to have a cause, whereas cause and effect was one of the concepts of the understanding and thus incapable of arriving at conclusions about the noumena. When Herder pointed this out and Kant didn't satisfactorily answer, the way was opened for all the excesses of German Romanticism and idealist essentialsms. But really Kant isn't one of those people. He may have made one claim too many, but it is central to his philosophy that we can't know about the noumena and that there is no bridge world (except for our apprehension of beauty, but that is a whole other matter).
Sharon Bowman
Sharon Bowman
Bob!
originally posted by maureen:
Professor, get this all out here on the board. So you don't bring it with you to Dino. :)
You don't worship the first critique? For shame.
originally posted by Sharon Bowman:
Bob!
Sharon!
All this enthusiastic punctuation!!
Beware!! Lest we be mistaken for Republican candidates.
Noumena kinda rhymes with Carly Fiorina. I sense an opportunity for Poetry Disorder.
Jonathan Loesberg
Jonathan Loesberg
originally posted by Bob Semon:
originally posted by Sharon Bowman:
Bob!
Sharon!
All this enthusiastic punctuation!!
Beware!! Lest we be mistaken for Republican candidates.
Noumena kinda rhymes with Carly Fiorina. I sense an opportunity for Poetry Disorder.
If you start with rhymes like that, it will certainly be disorderly. I look forward to seeing your phenomenal self.
Maureen, don't ask questions about concepts and you'll be safe.
Larry Stein
Larry Stein
You, me, Jonathan & Gail, Ian, Michael, Bob, Keith. I believe there's one more, but I don't have time right now to scroll through this thread.
Larry Stein
Larry Stein
Cole! That puts us at 9.
Ian Fitzsimmons
Ian Fitzsimmons
originally posted by maureen:
Professor, get this all out here on the board. So you don't bring it with you to Dino. :)
Right. For Monday, we should shift our focus to the role language plays in thought processes and concept formation. Required reading (listening): the Radiolab podcast Words, which includes a good micro-segment on Shakespeare and English. Not quite Wittgenstein, admittedly, but Jonathan will be able to help us bridge that gap.