TN: 2017 Falkenstein Krettnacher Euchariusberg Riesling Kabinett (AP 12)

[Peter Creasey]

We do a lot of carry-out dinners to go with wines from the cellar. Thus, I have many menus to order from. We almost always score the dishes we have with a number rating so that next time we order from the particular menu, we have the points as some benchmark.

In the case of wine, I agree the points by themselves are counter productive but otherwise add some degree of clarity to often unclear narrative.

Staying sensitive to folks here, I try to remember to omit points from notes posted here.

. . . . Pete

 

[Jonathan Loesberg]

Pete,

You should stand up for your caprices and post points. Others may not post points, but we all stand up for our caprices.

 

[Oswaldo Costa]

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jeff Grossman:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
All this without even getting into the greater and perhaps irrelevant question of whether we do in fact exist, or are just figments of some kind that have little choice but to believe that we do. In which case even objective truth becomes part of the illusion.

I thought M. Descartes addressed just exactly this question (Fourth Meditation?).

Many have addressed the issue of whether we exist, or whether a supreme being exists, but I believe it to be unknowable because thought itself could be part of the illusion.

If you merely think you're thinking, aren't you still thinking?

I don't think I think so.

 

[Jonathan Loesberg]

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jeff Grossman:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
All this without even getting into the greater and perhaps irrelevant question of whether we do in fact exist, or are just figments of some kind that have little choice but to believe that we do. In which case even objective truth becomes part of the illusion.

I thought M. Descartes addressed just exactly this question (Fourth Meditation?).

Many have addressed the issue of whether we exist, or whether a supreme being exists, but I believe it to be unknowable because thought itself could be part of the illusion.

If you merely think you're thinking, aren't you still thinking?

I don't think I think so.

What is it,then, that you don't think you aren't doing?

 

[Oswaldo Costa]

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jeff Grossman:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
All this without even getting into the greater and perhaps irrelevant question of whether we do in fact exist, or are just figments of some kind that have little choice but to believe that we do. In which case even objective truth becomes part of the illusion.

I thought M. Descartes addressed just exactly this question (Fourth Meditation?).

Many have addressed the issue of whether we exist, or whether a supreme being exists, but I believe it to be unknowable because thought itself could be part of the illusion.

If you merely think you're thinking, aren't you still thinking?

I don't think I think so.

What is it,then, that you don't think you aren't doing?

You are ascribing to me thoughts I didn't have. I am saying that the fact that we think, or that we think we think, proves nothing, because that may be a part of the illusion.

 

[Jonathan Loesberg]

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jeff Grossman:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
All this without even getting into the greater and perhaps irrelevant question of whether we do in fact exist, or are just figments of some kind that have little choice but to believe that we do. In which case even objective truth becomes part of the illusion.

I thought M. Descartes addressed just exactly this question (Fourth Meditation?).

Many have addressed the issue of whether we exist, or whether a supreme being exists, but I believe it to be unknowable because thought itself could be part of the illusion.

If you merely think you're thinking, aren't you still thinking?

I don't think I think so.

What is it,then, that you don't think you aren't doing?

You are ascribing to me thoughts I didn't have. I am saying that the fact that we think, or that we think we think, proves nothing, because that may be a part of the illusion.

An illusion is still a mental act. If we have the illusion we are thinking, that still counts as a thought. Of course, it may be someone else's illusion but then you are asserting a very odd intersubjective situation indeed.

 

[Jeff Grossman]

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
You are ascribing to me thoughts I didn't have. I am saying that the fact that we think, or that we think we think, proves nothing, because that may be a part of the illusion.

An illusion is still a mental act. If we have the illusion we are thinking, that still counts as a thought. Of course, it may be someone else's illusion but then you are asserting a very odd intersubjective situation indeed.

Right. Do not confuse a discussion of free will with a discussion of phenomenology (or epistemology, if you prefer).

 

[Oswaldo Costa]

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jeff Grossman:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
All this without even getting into the greater and perhaps irrelevant question of whether we do in fact exist, or are just figments of some kind that have little choice but to believe that we do. In which case even objective truth becomes part of the illusion.

I thought M. Descartes addressed just exactly this question (Fourth Meditation?).

Many have addressed the issue of whether we exist, or whether a supreme being exists, but I believe it to be unknowable because thought itself could be part of the illusion.

If you merely think you're thinking, aren't you still thinking?

I don't think I think so.

What is it,then, that you don't think you aren't doing?

You are ascribing to me thoughts I didn't have. I am saying that the fact that we think, or that we think we think, proves nothing, because that may be a part of the illusion.

An illusion is still a mental act. If we have the illusion we are thinking, that still counts as a thought. Of course, it may be someone else's illusion but then you are asserting a very odd intersubjective situation indeed.

No, an illusion of a mental act is not a mental act, it is an illusion of a mental act.

 

[Jonathan Loesberg]

You need to look up the word illusion. It is a false belief or an appearance that deceives the mind. It doesn't take place in the absence of a human being who has the illusion and he doesn't have it in his stomach or his foot, although, even if he did, that would be enough to indicate existence.

 

[Jeff Grossman]

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
No, an illusion of a mental act is not a mental act, it is an illusion of a mental act.

In order for it to be an illusion there must be a perceiver who is being deceived. That perceiver is thinking. That perceiver is you (because there is not a homunculus sitting in your head, looking through your eyes).

 

[Jayson Cohen]

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Jayson Cohen:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Jayson Cohen:
Ok. Let’s just stick to wine. I think that there is perceived value for many people in consensus and establishing community-held beliefs and values that you seem to be neglecting. Maybe because subjectively that holds no value for you - your norm, “nor should it”, suggests that. But I can’t deny that that value may influence what a particular person likes.

I read book reviews, movie reviews, restaurant reviews and even tasting notes on a couple of boards, just like the rest of you. If a whole bunch of certain reviewers like a movie, I'm likely to watch it at one point or another. Book reviews are easier since good ones offer summary, interpretation and analysis of a kind that gives me information in addition to the evaluation. And, of course, trying something I might not like is not a disaster for me. I've still tried something new. But, no, I don't take points seriously except as another form of language to communicate evaluation.

So I think we are in agreement. Consensus at last.

If it's only two of us, does that count as consensus?

In this case yes.

 

[Zachary Ross]

I'm Triple Curly on this thread.

 

[Jayson Cohen]

originally posted by Zachary Ross:
I'm Triple Curly on this thread.

Old school.

 

[Oswaldo Costa]

I disagree that an illusion needs a subject to experience it. This is only within linguistic logic, which I consider incapable of throwing light on existential matters. And while I don't believe that existential proofs are possible at all, I especially don't believe they can be derived from linguistic logic.

Since Plato's cave and surely earlier human beings have speculated about the possibly illusory nature of what we perceive as reality. If our entire universe were to be, say, a natural hologram, then both the thinker and the thought would be part and parcel of the same illusion, an illusion that is held by no one. The hologram could just exist, just as the universe could just exist without requiring a maker.

Of course on a day to day basis we go around believing that we exist in the manner in which we perceive ourselves, but there cannot be complete certainty, nor can it be derived from linguistic logic.

 

[Jonathan Loesberg]

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
I disagree that an illusion needs a subject to experience it. This is only within linguistic logic, which I consider incapable of throwing light on existential matters. And while I don't believe that existential proofs are possible at all, I especially don't believe they can be derived from linguistic logic.

Since Plato's cave and surely earlier human beings have speculated about the possibly illusory nature of what we perceive as reality. If our entire universe were to be, say, a natural hologram, then both the thinker and the thought would be part and parcel of the same illusion, an illusion that is held by no one. The hologram could just exist, just as the universe could just exist without requiring a maker.

Of course on a day to day basis we go around believing that we exist in the manner in which we perceive ourselves, but there cannot be complete certainty, nor can it be derived from linguistic logic.

You've really painted yourself into an impossible philosophical corner. It's not merely language. All the acts you describe entail your awareness that you are engaging in them. You can deny that illusion is a mental experience but you can't really coherently think it. If you believe you exist, you experience an act of believing--or have the illusion that you experience the act of believing, if you will, though I don't know how you can have an illusion about believing without have an inaccurate belief that you are believing, which is pretty clearly incoherent. I can say that the moon is green cheese but that won't make it so. There is a reason no one has argued against Descarte's claim. Even in your supposed case, if the hologram is a thinker, then it exists as such. It may not have material existence, but I assume that's not all you are arguing for. Plato's allegory, of course, did not question the existence of the human beings in the cave.

It's also a completely unnecessary corner. You can still commit yourself to radical solipsism, a position that is simultaneously unproveable and completely without any consequence, but at least tenable. And, of course, you don't have to commit yourself to radical solipsism to hold either ontological or epistemological relativism.

 

[Michael Lewis]

originally posted by Zachary Ross:
I'm Triple Curly on this thread.

I'm 95 points on this thread.

 

[Oswaldo Costa]

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
I disagree that an illusion needs a subject to experience it. This is only within linguistic logic, which I consider incapable of throwing light on existential matters. And while I don't believe that existential proofs are possible at all, I especially don't believe they can be derived from linguistic logic.

Since Plato's cave and surely earlier human beings have speculated about the possibly illusory nature of what we perceive as reality. If our entire universe were to be, say, a natural hologram, then both the thinker and the thought would be part and parcel of the same illusion, an illusion that is held by no one. The hologram could just exist, just as the universe could just exist without requiring a maker.

Of course on a day to day basis we go around believing that we exist in the manner in which we perceive ourselves, but there cannot be complete certainty, nor can it be derived from linguistic logic.

You've really painted yourself into an impossible philosophical corner. It's not merely language. All the acts you describe entail your awareness that you are engaging in them. You can deny that illusion is a mental experience but you can't really coherently think it. If you believe you exist, you experience an act of believing--or have the illusion that you experience the act of believing, if you will, though I don't know how you can have an illusion about believing without have an inaccurate belief that you are believing, which is pretty clearly incoherent. I can say that the moon is green cheese but that won't make it so. There is a reason no one has argued against Descarte's claim. Even in your supposed case, if the hologram is a thinker, then it exists as such. It may not have material existence, but I assume that's not all you are arguing for. Plato's allegory, of course, did not question the existence of the human beings in the cave.

It's also a completely unnecessary corner. You can still commit yourself to radical solipsism, a position that is simultaneously unproveable and completely without any consequence, but at least tenable. And, of course, you don't have to commit yourself to radical solipsism to hold either ontological or epistemological relativism.

I don't see myself in this characterization of my position and its implications, and I've explained it as clearly as I can. We'll just have to disagree to disagree before everyone slits their wrists.

 

[Jayson Cohen]

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
I disagree that an illusion needs a subject to experience it. This is only within linguistic logic, which I consider incapable of throwing light on existential matters. And while I don't believe that existential proofs are possible at all, I especially don't believe they can be derived from linguistic logic.

Since Plato's cave and surely earlier human beings have speculated about the possibly illusory nature of what we perceive as reality. If our entire universe were to be, say, a natural hologram, then both the thinker and the thought would be part and parcel of the same illusion, an illusion that is held by no one. The hologram could just exist, just as the universe could just exist without requiring a maker.

Of course on a day to day basis we go around believing that we exist in the manner in which we perceive ourselves, but there cannot be complete certainty, nor can it be derived from linguistic logic.

You've really painted yourself into an impossible philosophical corner. It's not merely language. All the acts you describe entail your awareness that you are engaging in them. You can deny that illusion is a mental experience but you can't really coherently think it. If you believe you exist, you experience an act of believing--or have the illusion that you experience the act of believing, if you will, though I don't know how you can have an illusion about believing without have an inaccurate belief that you are believing, which is pretty clearly incoherent. I can say that the moon is green cheese but that won't make it so. There is a reason no one has argued against Descarte's claim. Even in your supposed case, if the hologram is a thinker, then it exists as such. It may not have material existence, but I assume that's not all you are arguing for. Plato's allegory, of course, did not question the existence of the human beings in the cave.

It's also a completely unnecessary corner. You can still commit yourself to radical solipsism, a position that is simultaneously unproveable and completely without any consequence, but at least tenable. And, of course, you don't have to commit yourself to radical solipsism to hold either ontological or epistemological relativism.

I don't see myself in this characterization of my position and its implications, and I've explained it as clearly as I can. We'll just have to disagree to disagree before everyone slits their wrists.

Agreeing to disagree is a consensus. So I’m happy. Especially if it comes with prongs on the side.

 

[Oswaldo Costa]

originally posted by Jayson Cohen:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
I disagree that an illusion needs a subject to experience it. This is only within linguistic logic, which I consider incapable of throwing light on existential matters. And while I don't believe that existential proofs are possible at all, I especially don't believe they can be derived from linguistic logic.

Since Plato's cave and surely earlier human beings have speculated about the possibly illusory nature of what we perceive as reality. If our entire universe were to be, say, a natural hologram, then both the thinker and the thought would be part and parcel of the same illusion, an illusion that is held by no one. The hologram could just exist, just as the universe could just exist without requiring a maker.

Of course on a day to day basis we go around believing that we exist in the manner in which we perceive ourselves, but there cannot be complete certainty, nor can it be derived from linguistic logic.

You've really painted yourself into an impossible philosophical corner. It's not merely language. All the acts you describe entail your awareness that you are engaging in them. You can deny that illusion is a mental experience but you can't really coherently think it. If you believe you exist, you experience an act of believing--or have the illusion that you experience the act of believing, if you will, though I don't know how you can have an illusion about believing without have an inaccurate belief that you are believing, which is pretty clearly incoherent. I can say that the moon is green cheese but that won't make it so. There is a reason no one has argued against Descarte's claim. Even in your supposed case, if the hologram is a thinker, then it exists as such. It may not have material existence, but I assume that's not all you are arguing for. Plato's allegory, of course, did not question the existence of the human beings in the cave.

It's also a completely unnecessary corner. You can still commit yourself to radical solipsism, a position that is simultaneously unproveable and completely without any consequence, but at least tenable. And, of course, you don't have to commit yourself to radical solipsism to hold either ontological or epistemological relativism.

I don't see myself in this characterization of my position and its implications, and I've explained it as clearly as I can. We'll just have to disagree to disagree before everyone slits their wrists.

Agreeing to disagree is a consensus. So I’m happy. Especially if it comes with prongs on the side.

Alas, I didn't agree to disagree, but perhaps we can salvage your happiness by throwing in a set of 24 carat prongs that may or may not exist?

 

[Jayson Cohen]

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jayson Cohen:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:

originally posted by Jonathan Loesberg:

originally posted by Oswaldo Costa:
I disagree that an illusion needs a subject to experience it. This is only within linguistic logic, which I consider incapable of throwing light on existential matters. And while I don't believe that existential proofs are possible at all, I especially don't believe they can be derived from linguistic logic.

Since Plato's cave and surely earlier human beings have speculated about the possibly illusory nature of what we perceive as reality. If our entire universe were to be, say, a natural hologram, then both the thinker and the thought would be part and parcel of the same illusion, an illusion that is held by no one. The hologram could just exist, just as the universe could just exist without requiring a maker.

Of course on a day to day basis we go around believing that we exist in the manner in which we perceive ourselves, but there cannot be complete certainty, nor can it be derived from linguistic logic.

You've really painted yourself into an impossible philosophical corner. It's not merely language. All the acts you describe entail your awareness that you are engaging in them. You can deny that illusion is a mental experience but you can't really coherently think it. If you believe you exist, you experience an act of believing--or have the illusion that you experience the act of believing, if you will, though I don't know how you can have an illusion about believing without have an inaccurate belief that you are believing, which is pretty clearly incoherent. I can say that the moon is green cheese but that won't make it so. There is a reason no one has argued against Descarte's claim. Even in your supposed case, if the hologram is a thinker, then it exists as such. It may not have material existence, but I assume that's not all you are arguing for. Plato's allegory, of course, did not question the existence of the human beings in the cave.

It's also a completely unnecessary corner. You can still commit yourself to radical solipsism, a position that is simultaneously unproveable and completely without any consequence, but at least tenable. And, of course, you don't have to commit yourself to radical solipsism to hold either ontological or epistemological relativism.

I don't see myself in this characterization of my position and its implications, and I've explained it as clearly as I can. We'll just have to disagree to disagree before everyone slits their wrists.

Agreeing to disagree is a consensus. So I’m happy. Especially if it comes with prongs on the side.

Alas, I didn't agree to disagree, but perhaps we can salvage your happiness by throwing in a set of 24 carat prongs that may or may not exist?

Well it seems to me you are now all arguing about the meaning of the word illusion, perhaps rather than the underlying concept on which we may all agree - we cannot know whether, or prove that, what we observe or can observe is real or a projection of some reality we cannot observe fully. But we can seek to understand what we observe or can observe, make observations, and seek to reveal the rules or fundamental principles that govern what we can observe. Or maybe you disagree.

In any case I’ll take my prongs Rousseau Chambertin-infused with a sprinkle of Le Mont fairy dust and a Cheval Banc cherry on top.