Keith Levenberg
Keith Levenberg
Who could be bored by this? This stuff is riveting. I think we actually discussed the 8th amendment here awhile back. My view is that it's a peculiar amendment subject to changing meanings in a way that other provisions are not. That's because the term "unusual" sort of builds in the whole "evolving standards of decency" thing that in any other provision would be a made-up penumbra. The 4th amendment has something of this too in protecting against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. It's difficult to assess reasonableness without context. Suppose, however, there was legislative history from the founding era indicating that the people who wrote the 8th amendment unquestionably intended it to permit capital punishment. What relevance would that have to its constitutionality if the punishment were nevertheless both a) cruel and b) unusual?
Your Hamlet example reads like it builds on a large body of lit theory that I have never read, but I find it very odd. Of course if that monkey had typed out Hamlet, he would have written Hamlet! It doesn't even seem terribly uncommon for humans to accidentally create works of art that have meaning for others never intended by their creators, and for their reputation to hinge in large part on that unintended meaning. I'm not quite sure what pertinence this has to the legislative history issue, but it's an interesting question in an angels-dancing-on-the-head-of-a-pin sort of way.
I think it's important to note that the textualist objection to legislative history originated in a historical backdrop in which legislative history was used to introduce ambiguity rather than to resolve it. You might think it went too far in the other direction, but I'm not sure they go as far as you think they're going. They are not opposed to all forms of external context, just particular types of legislative history that are particularly prone to abuse (floor statements by individuals that represent the views of 0.03% of the people whose intentions are relevant, committee reports written by staff that might represent the views of 0.0% of the people whose intentions are relevant). There are other types of extrinsic evidence of intended meaning which are not controversial, some of which one might fairly put in a bucket called "legislative history" (for example, histories of the way in which a statute is amended against a backdrop of judicial decisions of which Congress is presumed to be aware).
Your Hamlet example reads like it builds on a large body of lit theory that I have never read, but I find it very odd. Of course if that monkey had typed out Hamlet, he would have written Hamlet! It doesn't even seem terribly uncommon for humans to accidentally create works of art that have meaning for others never intended by their creators, and for their reputation to hinge in large part on that unintended meaning. I'm not quite sure what pertinence this has to the legislative history issue, but it's an interesting question in an angels-dancing-on-the-head-of-a-pin sort of way.
I think it's important to note that the textualist objection to legislative history originated in a historical backdrop in which legislative history was used to introduce ambiguity rather than to resolve it. You might think it went too far in the other direction, but I'm not sure they go as far as you think they're going. They are not opposed to all forms of external context, just particular types of legislative history that are particularly prone to abuse (floor statements by individuals that represent the views of 0.03% of the people whose intentions are relevant, committee reports written by staff that might represent the views of 0.0% of the people whose intentions are relevant). There are other types of extrinsic evidence of intended meaning which are not controversial, some of which one might fairly put in a bucket called "legislative history" (for example, histories of the way in which a statute is amended against a backdrop of judicial decisions of which Congress is presumed to be aware).